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STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-45-9 (1953) ----------------------------------
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs--
REGGIE McGEE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12412 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Mr. McGee 
for Subornation of Perjury in the First Degree rendered 
in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould, pre-
siding. 
DISPOSITION lN THE LOWER COURT 
Commencing on November 24, 1970, Mr. McGee was 
trisd in the Second Judicial District Court before the 
i-1.Jnoruble Calvin Gould, District Judge. On November 
2 
25, 1970, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and judg. 
ment was entered in accordance with that verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State submits ihat the judgment of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 23rd day of September, 1969, at approximately 
4: 4G p.m. a .22 caliber pistol was stolen from the Sunset 
Sporting Goods store in Roy, Utah (R. 87). Mr. Jim 
Marberger, the manager of the store on that date, con-
fronted Mr. McGee, found the stolen gun on his person 
and proceeded to call the police (R. 86-92). Officer 
Marion Hammond of the Roy City Police Department 
investigated the crime. He proceeded to advise Mr. McGee 
of his constitutional rights and Mr. McGee agreed to dis· 
cuss the incident (R. 14, 15). Officer Hammond later 
testified that at that investigation Mr. McGee admitted 
taking the pistol (R. 116). 
On January 14, 1970, the trial concerning the grand 
larceny of the pistol was held in the Second Judicial Dis· 
trict Court, in and for ·weber County, State of Utah. At 
that trial one Eldridge Williams testified that he had 
stolen the gun and Mr. McGee testified that he, himsell, 
had not (R. 13, 24) . 
The instant case thus arises from the testimony of 
Mr. Williams and Mr. McGee at that trial. 
• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-45-9 (1953) CONSISTS OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF SUBORNATION AND PER-
JURY AND BOTH ELEMENTS WERE SUF-
FICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY THE STA TE 
TO CONVICT MR. McGEE OF THE CRIME 
CHARGED. 
Mr. McGee contends in his brief that the State did 
not corroborate the testimony of Eldridge Williams spe-
cifically on the issue of the perjury. It is the position of 
the State, as was it the position of Judge Gould, that no 
such corroboration is nscessary in the instant case. 
It is generally accepted in a trial for perjury that 
the falsity of the alleg13dly perjured statement must be 
established by the testimony of two independent witnesses 
or one witness and corroborating circumstances. There-
fore, the conviction for perjury may not be secured or 
sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness 
to the falsity of the matter on which the perjury is as-
signed. Implicit in the evolution of this rule has been the 
fear that innocent witnesses may be unduly harassed and 
coerced resulting in an improper conviction. In the in-
stant case, however, we have the situation where one wit-
ness did testify as to the perjury and the circumstanc~s 
corroborated that testimony, to-wit: Eldridge Williams 
was the perjurer and the suborned witness and his testi-
4 
mony wa:3 that he had committed perjury m the prior 
Vial (R. 9-11). 
In State v. Gleason, 86 U. 26, 40 P. 2d 222 (1935) 
the Court held that the "two witness rule" or the "on9 
witness with cor.rnbornting circumstances" rule did apply 
to subornation of perjury cases in Utah. In effect, then, 
the court said that in all subornation of perjury cases the 
prosecution must prove both the perjury, by wsy of the 
traditional rules above, dnd the subornation. 
The State agrees that in the typical case of perjury 
or subornation of perjury where the perjurer is defending 
his innocence, the rules should be strictly adhered to. 
However, where, as in the instant case, the perjurer him-
self testified that he had perjured himself in earlier testi-
mony, that, in and of 1t~elf, is sufficient to corroborate 
the testimony and establish the perjury. Again, the Court 
in Gleason did not say that the "two witness" rule applied 
in every case. Rather, one witness with corroborating cir-
cumstances would suffice in many instances. Gleason, 
supra at 226. 
The State does not stand alone in its position that 
the confes3ion of the perjurer in open court to the perjury 
is sufficient to e3tablish the perjury. 
In the case of State v. Johnson, 374 P. 2d 504, 506, 
(Mont. 1962), the Supreme Court of Montana said, in 
reference to the "two witness rule": 
"The rule is intended to prevent scm~·ilcus 
prosecution, but the rule has no c.pplication whe··e 
5 
the accused admits on the stand, 0~1 the trial for 
the offense, that he has committed the offense . 
. . . His admission obviates any need for protec-
tion from malicious prosecution." (Emphasis ours.) 
In the subornation of perjury case of Commonwealth 
v. Leitch, 107 A. 2d 909 (Penn. 1958), the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania said: 
"The two-witness rule as to the truth of per-
jury prevails in Pennsylvania .... 'The purpose of 
the rule is to protect one from a conviction of per-
jury upon the testimony of a single •vitness. Where 
the perjurer admits his guilt, the reason for the 
rule ceases to exist." (Emphasis ours.) 
Such a position as is now taken by the State has also 
appeared in many federal court cases. In United States 
v. Buckner, 118 F. 2d 468 (2d Cir. 1941), the court held: 
"It has been the general rule that a conviction 
for perjury cannot be sustained by mere evidence 
of inconsistent or contradictory statements made 
under oath, but the falsity of the statement 
charged to be perjured must be established by 
either two independent witnesses, or by one wit-
ness who is supported by independent evidence 
that is 'inconsistent with the innocence of the de-
fendant.' While the proof in the present case did 
not formally meet the above requirements, we 
think the repeated admissions of the defenda..--it 
that her testimony before the grand jury was false 
was a fair substitute for the confirmatory testi-
mony which is g:merally required in perjury cases . 
. . . Her acts and testimony had become the pn-.c-
tical equivalent of a plea of guilty." J 18 F. 2d at 
469. 
6 
See also United States v. Nessanbaum, 205 F. 2d 93 (3d 
Cir. 1953); and United States v. Green, 421 F. 2d 1237 
(2d Cir. 1970). 
The State, therefore, submits that the admission by 
Eldridge Williams that he did lie about his stealing the 
pistol in the earlier grand larceny trial was sufficient to 
prove the perjury (R. 1, 10, 11, 123). The State also sub. 
mits that the "one witness with corroborative circum-
stances" test as supplied by Gleason, supra, and followed 
by Utah, was sufficiently fulfilled by the State at the trial 
of Mr. McGee: 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 
STATE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
MR. McGEE BY A JURY OF SUBORNATION 
OF PERJURY. 
Mr. McGee contends that the State never did prove 
that Mr. Williams was suborned; to-wit: that Mr. Wil· 
Iiams did not testify chat he was suborned. The State 
can only suggest that the appellant scrutinize the record. 
The State directs the appellant and this Court to page 
125 of the record and the dialogue: 
Q. Do you understand my last question? 
What I am asking is did Mr. McGee suggest t:o 
you as to what you should testify to in that trial? 
A. Yea. 
Q. And what did he suggest you should say 
in that trial? 
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A. That I lnd taken the gun. 
Further in the record at page 127: 
Q. Now was there any particular reason dis-
cussed as to why you should testify to this? 
A. I wouldn't get in any trouble. 
Q. And why did they say you wouldn't get 
in any trouble? 
A. Because I was a juvenile. 
Still further on page 135: 
Q. The conversation you have talked about 
earlier today in this trial, the one where you don't 
know where it was or when it was or where it was 
at or anything else. Do you recall basically what 
was said by you and by Reggie? 
A. Basically, I don't. I just remember that 
we talked about the trial and what I was supposed 
to do. 
Page 146: 
Q. Okay. Now, did Mr. McGee suggest to 
you or tell you what you should say at the first 
trial? 
A. Yes. 
Page 151: 
Q. Mr. Williams, now so that I understand 
exactly the situation, did or did not Mr. McGee 
suggest or tell you what to say in the trial con-
cerning grand larceny? 
8 
A. Kind of like you know, just a sucgcstion. 
But I did it on my own. 
It is quite clear from the testimony of Mr. Williams 
' 
'chat although he wanted to lie for the defendant at the 
grand larceny trial, it was the defendant who initially 
procured such testimony. 
Fin2.1ly, in Eght of the evidence and findings by the 
jury, Mr. McGee ar>serts that his conviction was based 
on insufficient evidence. It is well established in Utah 
and other jurisdictions that it is the function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and base their verdict on all of the 
circumstances. In State v. Hitesman, 58 U. 262, 198 P. 2d 
769 (1921), this Court said: 
"While the law is to the effect that a jury 
may not arbitrarily ignore or disregard credible 
evidence, then, nevertheless, need not blindly ac-
cept every explanation or statement .... The jury, 
in considering all the facts and circumstances in 
evidence, may refuse to give credence to the de-
fendant's statements or explanations, or to those 
of his witnesses, if such statements or explanations, 
in view of all the facts and circumstances, seem 
unreasonable or not well founded in fact." (Em-
phris ours.) 
It is also well established in this state that the jury 
may give whatever weight to a witness's testimony as they 
see fit in light of the facts and circumstances presented. 
In fact on numerous occasions this Court has determined 
that the ju;'o:s are the sole judges of fact and the credi-
bility cf \-i~"'.112~~sec;, of th; weight and effect of such evi-
dence, and what inferences are to be drawn from that 
9 
evidence. State v. Sullivan, 6 U. 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212 
(1957) ; State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 142 P. 2d 247 (1943); 
State v. Entrada, 119 U. 339, 227 P. 2d 247 (1951) ; and 
State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947). 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing facts and authorities, the 
State respectfully submits that Mr. McGee was in all 
respects given a fair trial, and that perjury as an element 
of subornation of perjury was established and that the 
state presented substantial evidence as to the subornation 
of Mr. Williams. The judgment of the district court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAURENN.BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
